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UNOCAL AND THE DEMISE OF CORPORATE NEUTRALITY
MARK D. KIELSGARD*
INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in international human rights jurisprudence
and the conduct of transnational corporations indicate a changing view
of corporate responsibility for human rights norms. Corporations are
voluntarily embracing human rights principles as company policy,I
domestic courts in the United States are enforcing jus cogens2 and
other norms in cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA),3 and the United Nations Human Rights Commission is con-
sidering the formation of a template for international scrutiny of cor-
porate practices that parallels the model for states.4 These trends are
modest and at times hotly contested, yet they constitute a fruitful basis
for activism. Moreover, these developments trigger a change in cor-
porate accountability, which discredit previous corporate recourse to
neutrality arguments sounding in cultural relativism, economic deter-
minism, and non-intervention in domestic affairs. Corporate conces-
sion to voluntarism is a concession to the invalidity of corporate neu-
trality and creates an obligation to proactively ensure human rights
protections.
* Mark D. Kielsgard is a former trial attorney and current J.S.D. candidate in International
Criminal and Human Rights Law. The author would like to thank his wife, Tamara L.
Crouch, for her continuing assistance and encouragement.
1. See generally What is the Global Compact?, http://www.unglobalcompact.org
/content/AboutTheGC/OverviewAbout.htm?iViewld=253 (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
2. "Latin meaning 'compelling law.' This 'higher law' may not be violated by any
country." Legal-Explanations, http://www.legal-explanations.com/definitions/jus-cogens.htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
3. See generally Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
4. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Promotion & Prot. of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business En-
terprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,
2003), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrtsflinks/norms-Aug2003.html [hereinafter
Norms].
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Critics argue that voluntarism is no more than a public relations
ploy aimed at promoting a positive public image and lacks sincere
commitment to alter corporate conduct to conform to human rights
norms.' However, this criticism jumps to an easy conclusion and fails
to appreciate the function of voluntarism or recognize the indispensa-
ble role it plays. When corporations voluntarily take a stand they
open the door for human rights advocates to use the corporations' own
policies and rhetoric to prod the corporations into compliance or ulti-
mately, against them for impeachment purposes. Moreover, volunta-
rism acts as a vehicle for corporate executives who genuinely wish to
conform to international law. It provides an intellectual response to
corporate neutrality and acts as a link in the evolution of corporate ac-
countability. Voluntarism, though largely ineffectual in a vacuum,
enables the progression to more binding norms and acts in concert
with the intellectual and political justification of accountability. On
the heels of corporate voluntarism, illustrated by the U.N. Global
Compact,6 the U.S./U.K Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights,7 and individual, internal corporate human rights declarations
and policies, come more binding norms and international oversight in
the form of the United Nation's Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Re-
gard to Human Rights.8 Moreover, recent developments in the ATCA
case of John Doe v. Unocal9 and the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machainl matter
have given new momentum to the call for binding corporate account-
ability for human rights abuses.
This article will survey some recent issues in international busi-
ness accountability that reveal an apparent shift toward a new sensitiv-
ity to human rights issues including new developments for the estab-
lishment of a set of binding norms, the advantages and disadvantages
of voluntarism, some implications of the recent settlement of the Uno-
cal case, and the continuing corporate battle against the ATCA. Addi-
5. See generally Terry Collingsworth, "Corporate Social Responsibility," Unmasked,
16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 669 (2004).
6. See generally Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Oct. 20,
2005).
7. See U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Fact
Sheet: Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Feb. 20, 2001),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
8. Norms, supra note 4.
9. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), dismissed on motion for
summary judgment, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), sub-
mission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
10. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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tionally, this article will show the value of corporate voluntarism for
subsequent impeachment purposes and will be at once contextual, de-
scriptive, analytical, and participatory by exploring the significance of
the Unocal settlement in the context of the asynchronous dichotomy
extant in the corporate accountability debate between voluntarism and
binding norms. Simultaneously, this article seeks to actively partici-
pate by impeaching the dubious claims to human rights adherence
made by Unocal and significant portions of the international business
community on the basis of their clams made in the Alvarez-Machain
case and to generally contribute to the reformation of the practices of
transnational corporations.
VOLUNTARISM VS. BINDING NORMS
December 2004 saw a landmark settlement in the case of John
Doe v. Unocal Corporation." The complaint had been filed by a
group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private attor-
neys' 2 on behalf of fourteen Burmese villagers more than eight years
earlier and sounded in the ATCA. 13 The complaint alleged that in the
course of constructing the Yadana gas pipeline through
Burma/Myanmar the defendant corporation partnered with the brutal
military regime in power (SLORC) 14 and conspired to cause human
rights violations "including coerced labor, the forced removal of vil-
11. 963 F. Supp. at 880.
12. 395 F.3d at 936. Plaintiffs' counsel included representatives of EarthRights Interna-
tional (ERI), 395 F.3d at 936, a non-profit NGO dedicated to the defense of human rights and
environmental rights, EarthRights International, http://www.earthrights.org/about
/mission.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2005), the International Labor Rights Fund, 395 F.3d at
936, "an advocacy organization dedicated to ... just and humane treatment for workers
worldwide," International Labor Rights Fund, http://www.laborrights.org/about/index.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2005), and the Center for Constitutional Rights, 395 F.3d at 936, "a non-
profit legal and educational organization dedicated to... advancing the rights guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Ctr. for Constitu-
tional Rights, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/about/mission-vision.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
Private firms and attorneys included Bostwick & Hoffman, Hadsell & Stormer, Judith Brown
Chomsky, and Julie Shapiro. 395 F.3d at 936.
13. 395 F.3d at 943. In addition to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (Alien Tort Claims Act and
Torture Victim Protection Act), the complaint also cited jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000) (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (supplemental jurisdiction);
and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). 395
F.3d at 943.
14. 395 F.3d at 937-38. SLORC is the abbreviation for the State Law and Order Resto-
ration Council. Id. at 937.
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lagers, murder, rape, and other torture . . ."I' Among the specific
counts were allegations that they burned down two houses, seized the
villagers' household possessions, kicked a nursing mother with her in-
fant into a fire (ultimately causing the baby's death),1 6 forced villager
relocation, forced villager labor or extorted bribes in lieu of labor, beat
an 18-year-old villager (who subsequently died of his injuries) beyond
recognition, 7 confiscated property and livestock (including chickens,
cows, pigs and harvested grains), required the payment of a fee in or-
der for villagers to farm their own land, and later imposed restrictions
on villager movements preventing them from harvesting their crops. 8
Additionally, village officials were allegedly abducted, bound in the
center of the village, and punished through the use of water torture for
failure to provide sufficient labor. 9 Some of those forced to labor
were literally beaten to death.20 Multiple women suffered rape or at-
tempted rape,21 and pregnant women and children were forced to en-
dure hard labor if the men were dead or unable to work.22 During
1996, "SLORC soldiers.., tied a noose around the neck of [one vil-
lage's leader], killed at least eight people, and tortured one youth."23
According to Unocal's stated human rights policy, Human Rights
and Unocal: A Discussion Paper,24 as "[a]n American company that is
more than a century old, Unocal is proud of its global reputation...
we take to heart our commitment 'to improve the lives of people
wherever we work[,]"' 25 and "[o]ur goal at Unocal is to operate as an
'island of integrity' wherever we do business."26 Unocal says that it
15. Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Docket. Doe v. Unocal, Synopsis, Jan. 31, 2005,
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/corporate-accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObjID=lrRSFK
nmmm&Content=45.
16. Third Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
paras. 50-66, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), dismissed on motion
for summary judgment, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), affid in part, rev'd in part,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003),
submission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. CV 96-6959-RAP (BQRx)).
17. Id. paras. 67-77. John Doe IX was required to pay approximately 70% of his in-
come to SLORC in extorted fees, including forced labor fees. Id. para. 138.
18. Id. paras. 83-92.
19. Id. para. 89(e).
20. Id. para. 89(c).
21. Id. paras. 93-95.
22. Id. para. 101.
23. Id. para. 118.
24. Unocal Corp., Human Rights and Unocal: A Discussion Paper,
http://www.unocal.conresponsibility/humanrights/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2005)
(subsequently removed from Unocal website, see infra note 158).
25. Id. (follow "Our Position" hyperlink).
26. Id. (follow "Next Steps" hyperlink).
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"ha[s] seen time and again how [its] presence has improved the qual-
ity of life for people .... -27 The Discussion Paper further contends
that "Unocal supports the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[,]" 28
which explicitly prohibits the behavior alleged in the complaint. 29 The
credibility of Unocal's claims is cast in doubt in light of the recent set-
tlement of the Burma/Myanmar case.
While the terms of the settlement are confidential, plaintiffs con-
tend, "the settlement in principle will compensate plaintiffs and pro-
vide funds enabling plaintiffs and their representatives to develop pro-
grams to improve living conditions, health care and education and
protect the rights of people from the pipeline region."30 Unocal states
that it "reaffirms its principle that the company respects human rights
in all of its activities and commits to enhance its educational programs
to further this principle."'" This ATCA action represents the first case
of its kind to survive two motions for summary judgment, the first via
appeal to the Ninth Circuit in 2002,32 and the second in September
2004 despite amicus briefs filed by U.S. government lawyers.33 These
victories undoubtedly led to the settlement three months later.34 Plain-
tiffs' attorneys (from the Center for Constitutional Rights) stated that
the "Ninth Circuit decision is a remarkable victory not just for the
plaintiffs involved, but for the effort to hold corporations responsible
for their participation in atrocities abroad and at home in the name of
shareholder profits."35
27. Id. (follow "Business and Human Rights" hyperlink).
28. Id. (follow "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" hyperlink).
29. The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights establishes as a common standard, in-
ter alia, the right to life (Article 3), the prohibition against slavery or servitude (Article 4),
freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (Article 5), equal protec-
tion under the law (Article 7), freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention (Article 9), "freedom
of movement ... within the borders of each [country]" (Article 13(1)), right to own property
and not be arbitrarily deprived of that property (Article 17), "the right to work, to free choice
of employment, to just and favourable" working conditions (Article 23(1)), "the right to just
and favourable remuneration" (Article 23(3)), and the entitlement of special consideration for
motherhood and childhood (Article 25(2)). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948),
available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
30. Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Settlement Reached in Principle in
Unocal Human Rights Lawsuit, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/print-page.asp?ObjfD=Lr02CI89
YT&Content=483.
31. Id.
32. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 962 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g granted en
banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), submission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
33. Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, supra note 15.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Perhaps the most remarkable lesson from the Unocal settlement is
the discrepancy between the corporation's human rights policy and the
atrocities over which it has arguably assumed some liability, at least
by implication. The apparent failure of Unocal's human rights policy
is that it is a product of corporate voluntarism, grounded in self-
imposed, non-binding norms.3 6 This case also does not appear to be
singular as there are numerous examples of other transnational corpo-
rations who are also allegedly complicit in the commission of atroci-
ties abroad37 (in apparent violation of their own corporate human
36. It should be noted that Unocal did not develop its discussion paper until after the
atrocities alleged in the complaint, see Unocal Corp., http://www.unocal.com (last visited Oct.
5, 2005), but the language in the document of being "proud of its [100 year] global reputa-
tion[,]" its assertion that it has seen "how [its] presence has improved the quality of life .. "
and "[t]he main difference between our activities in other countries decades ago and in
Myanmar now, is that Myanmar has become highly politicized, even though our approach
has remained the same," Unocal Corp., supra note 24 (emphasis added), all claim a historic
continuity of commitment to accepted human rights norms and that the discussion paper was
merely a rendering of a policy put in place long before the atrocities in Burma/Myanmar.
37. Some other allegations of corporate complicity in human rights atrocities include,
inter alia, the activities of Royal Dutch/Shell oil group who allegedly conspired to commit the
extra-judicial execution of environmental and community leaders Ken Saro-Wiwa and John
Kpuinen by hanging, the torture and unlawful detention of other individuals, and the shooting
of a woman peacefully protesting the destruction of her crops, in an attempt to suppress the
Ogoni peoples' opposition to the defendants' long history of environmental and human rights
abuses in the Ogoni region of Nigeria, pursuant to their efforts to build a pipeline. See Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
28, 2002). Another example is the alleged intimidation of union leaders in Guatemala by
Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., which took the form of torture, kidnapping, unlawful deten-
tion, crimes against humanity, denial of the fight to associate and organize and extra-judicial
killing. See Villeda v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
12, 2003). Further examples include the systematic violations of human rights, including
summary execution, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, to suppress peaceful
protests against Chevron's environmental practices in Parabe, Opia, and Ikenyan, Nigeria, see
Bowoto v. Chevron, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004), the unauthorized spraying of
toxic herbicides by DynCorp in an effort to eradicate cocaine and heroin crops in Ecuador,
which resulted in medical problems including congenital birth defects, permanent skin irrita-
tions, blisters, death, loss of subsistence crops and livestock, as well as torture, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and extra-judicial killing, Class Action Complaint for Equitable Relief
and Damages at 5-11, 16-18, 24-26, Arias v. DynCorp., No. I:01CV01908 (RWR) (D.D.C.
2001), available at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/dyncorp/ dyncorpcom-
plaint.doc, and alleged extra-judicial killing, torture, and crimes against humanity against vil-
lagers from Aceh, Indonesia at the hands of Indonesian military who, although responsible for
the massacres in East Timor, were hired by Exxon Mobil to provide security for its natural
gas facilities, and who perpetrated these human rights abuses on Exxon Mobil compounds
after Exxon Mobil had specific knowledge of the atrocities committed by its security forces,
see Complaint for Equitable Relief Damages at 12-25, 27-31, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.
01CV01357 (D.D.C. 2001), available at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/
exxon/exxoncomplaint.pdf. Still more examples include the targeting and extermination of
trade union leaders with the consent of managers in Coca-Cola bottling plants in Columbia by
paramilitaries, see Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003), the
extra-judicial killing of trade union leaders by paramilitaries allegedly hired by Drummond
Company Inc. in Columbia, see Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co. Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d
6
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rights policies).38 The Unocal atrocities were, arguably, illustrative of
the continuing failure of voluntarism, yet voluntarism was ultimately
vindicated by the settlement,3 9 at least to the extent that it was useful
to impeach Unocal with its own statements.4 0 Nonetheless, the Uno-
cal case pointedly displays the need to move toward more binding
norms of international corporate responsibility.
In an address to the World Economic Forum on January 28, 2001,
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked, "how do you explain ...
why the global system of rules ... is tougher in protecting intellectual
property rights than in protecting fundamental human rights?"'" He
described corporate responsibility as the refusal to finance warlords
and other massive human rights violators (with governmental or
quasi-governmental authority), the distribution of medicines for en-
demic diseases, the resolution of armed conflicts, the building of nec-
essary infrastructure, and the improvement of local market economies,
as well as debt relief, development assistance, and the opening of
markets in the industrialized states to developing nations.4 2 Kofi An-
nan advocated making human rights policy an integral element of the
business model for transnational corporations doing business in the
developing world but was silent on the issue of imposing enforceable
1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003), corporate complicity in apartheid in South Africa, see In re South Af-
rican Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), alleged illegal testing of
drugs on children in Kano, Nigeria, see Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118 (WTHP),
2005 WL 1870811 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2002), and environmental and human rights abuses in
Papua New Guinea, see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
38. See generally Chevron-Human Rights, http://www.chevron.comlsocial responsibil-
ity/human rights/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2005); ExxonMobil, http://www.exxonmobil.com/
corporate/files/corporate/CCR2002communities.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2005); Shell-Our
Approach to Human Rights, http://www.shell.comihome/Framework?siteld=royal-
en&FC2=&FC3=/royalen/html/iwgen/environment and society/key-issues.and-topics/issue
sfhumanjrights/our-approach to humanjrights.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
39. The Unocal settlement may encourage other companies to settle their ATCA cases
and to take sincere steps to abide by human rights norms abroad. However, because of "very
high standard[s] of legal and factual proof[,]" only six out of approximately forty comparable
cases filed since 1996 have survived an initial motion to dismiss. Interview by Amy Good-
man with Sandra Coliver, Executive Director, Center for Justice and Accountability, on-air
with Democracy Now! (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.democracynow.org (enter
Sandra Coliver under "search for" archives; then click on "Unocal Settles Landmark Human
Rights Case with Burmese Villagers" hyperlink).
40. Unocal's code of good conduct was an important feature of the ATCA litigation and
"came back to haunt that company when it was sued for human rights violations." Eric Engle,
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based Remedies for International Human
Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 103, 112 n.66 (2004).
41. Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y-Gen., In Address to the World Economic Forum, Secre-
tary-General Says Globalization Must Work for All (Jan. 28, 2001), http://www.unis.unvi-
enna. org/unis/pressrels/2001/sg2772.html.
42. Id.
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binding norms.43 In short, he was discussing voluntarism. Corporate
responsibility for business activities under public international law
necessarily discloses a dichotomy between voluntarism and binding
corporate accountability.
In responding to the call for corporate accountability for human
rights violations, some industry representatives opine that the "the
chief mission of businesses ... is to create wealth and generate profits
for [their] shareholders"' and that the maintenance of human rights is
a function (and responsibility) of government. 45 Opponents of corpo-
rate responsibility argue that it would be improper for corporations to
impose their western values on other states, that transnational corpo-
rate influence will spur domestic economic development and give rise
to a middle class who will demand human rights without the necessity
of direct corporate intervention, that human rights is a political ques-
tion, and that business should not interfere with domestic politics.'
Thus, critics argue cultural relativism, economic determinism, and
non-intervention in domestic affairs. On the other hand, proponents of
the applicability of human rights norms argue that doing business in
the developing world already imposes "western" cultural ideals, such
as capitalism, and that economic determinism takes too long and typi-
cally does not work, as the profits usually do not trickle down in order
to create a middle classy.4  Finally, reluctance to interfere in domestic
43. See id.
44. Pierre Sane, Why Human Rights Should Matter to the Business World, EARTH TIMES
NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform200l/0108ps.htm.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Economic determinism has been criticized as simplistic, flawed, and lacking em-
pirical support. In his book, Setting Global Standards: Guidelines for Creating Codes of
Conduct in Multinational Corporations, author S. Prakash Sethi argues,
[Multinational Corporations] and the governments of industrially advanced coun-
tries have asserted, albeit gratuitously, that the greater expansion of international
trade and economic growth will lead to a fostering of democratic institutions and
improvement in the human rights records of developing countries where authori-
tarian and totalitarian regimes currently hold sway. Such assertions are made al-
most as truisms. Yet they are actually untenable.
S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS, GUIDELINES FOR CREATING CODES OF
CONDUCT IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 6 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2003). Sethi adds,
"Globalization and the dominant role of MNCs do not provide any mechanisms to enhance a
country's economic infrastructure and instead push lower its already meager fiscal re-
sources .... " Id. at 9. Timothy Smith, President of Social Investment Forum and former Ex-
ecutive Director of Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, asserts,
[S]weatshops and human rights abuses are not an inevitable price of economic
growth in poorer countries or of profits for transnational corporations. Instead,
they destroy democratic values and harm free enterprise. Multinational corpora-
tions cannot earn public trust without comprehensive independent external moni-
8
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policy is a baseless reason as corporations routinely interfere in order
to influence domestic policy as it relates to their ability to conduct
business. 48
All three theories relied upon by traditional opponents are anti-
thetical not only to binding norms but to the concept of voluntarism.
Corporations that publicly embrace voluntarism can no longer advo-
cate these traditional arguments because they lay bare the hypocrisy of
corporate neutrality. The Global Compact states that "[b]usinesses
should support and respect the protection of internationally pro-
claimed human rights" (Principle 1) and they should "make sure that
they are not complicit in human rights abuses" (Principle 2). 49 These
norms, voluntarily (and publicly) accepted by many of the world's
corporate leaders,5" pointedly contradict core assertions of cultural
relativism, economic determinism, and non-intervention. Principle 1
proclaims the international applicability, and therefore universality of
human rights, which, by definition, repudiates cultural relativism.5
toring and compliance verification of voluntary codes of conduct, as well as public
disclosure of their findings.
Timothy Smith, President, Social Investment Forum, Praise for Setting Global Standards,
http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCD-0471414557,descCd-description
(last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
Long-held judgments about the development process, as well as the work-horse
formal models of economic growth suggest that the poorer countries should tend to
grow more rapidly than richer countries and therefore should close the proportion-
ate income gap over time. The main reason for expecting economic convergence
is that the poorer countries can import capital and modem technologies from the
wealthier countries, and thereby reap the "advantage of backwardness." Yet in re-
cent decades, there has been no overall tendency for the poorer countries to catch
up or converge with the richer countries.
SETHI, supra at 5 (quoting Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and the Proc-
ess of Global Integration, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1-118 (1995)).
Moreover, in 2003 Sethi further observed,
Globalization and economic growth have had adverse side effects. Distribution of
gains from international trade and investment has been highly skewed in favor of
those who control the capital and against those who contribute human labor, espe-
cially in the developing countries. According to the World Bank, the disparity be-
tween rich and poor countries has grown 10 times wider during the past 30 years.
SETHI, supra at 5.
48. Sane, supra note 44.
49. Global Compact, The Ten Principles, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/con-
tent/AboutTheGC/TheNinePrinciples/thenine.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2005).
50. As of October 30, 2005, more than 2,000 corporations worldwide had joined the
Global Compact since its launch date of July 26, 2000. Global Compact, The Next Stages of
Development, http://www.unglobalcompact.org (follow "About the GC" hyperlink; then fol-
low "The GC: Next Stages of Development" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
51. In its discussion paper, Unocal claimed to adhere to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Unocal Corp., supra note 24 (follow "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights" hyperlink), but the Universal Declaration proclaims its universality "as a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations .... [and] to secure their universal and
effective recognition and observance," Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
9
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Nor is it plausible to maintain that going into business with nations
that systematically engage in massive human rights abuses, and con-
sequently enriching and empowering these ruthless regimes, "sup-
port[s] and respect[s] the protection of internationally proclaimed hu-
man rights."52 Finally, non-intervention is antithetical to Principle 2,
which implies the responsibility of boycotting all host nations with
reputations for human rights violations. This position is further sup-
ported by the U.S. -U.K. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights, which call upon corporations to conduct risk assessments and
to "consider the available human rights records of public security
forces, paramilitaries, local and national law enforcement . . .-5 and
state that, "[c]ompanies have an interest in ensuring that actions taken
by governments, particularly the actions of public security providers,
are consistent with the protection and promotion of human rights. 5 4
This creates a duty on the part of the corporation to either boycott the
host nation or intervene as it relates to human rights protection and is
thereby antithetical to non-interventionism.
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights further
stipulate that "individuals credibly implicated in human rights abuses
should not provide security services for [c]ompanies."55 Yet, although
Exxon and Unocal are signatories to these principles, both are alleged
to have violated them. Exxon allegedly hired veteran Indonesian mili-
tary personnel who were responsible for the massive human rights
abuses, including mass murder in East Timor, as security of their natu-
ral gas facility in Aceh, Indonesia.5 6 Unocal partnered with SLORC,
whose reputation for violence, forced labor, and abundant human
rights abuses were well documented prior to Unocal's participation in
the pipeline project. 7
29. In this clear and unambiguous language, the Declaration repudiates any notions that hu-
man rights are malleable from one culture to the next and refutes any legitimacy for corporate
reliance on cultural relativism with respect to human rights norms.
52. The Ten Principles, supra note 49.
53. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 7.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Complaint for Equitable Relief Damages, supra note 37, at 12-17.
57. See ILO, FORCED LABOUR IN MYANMAR (BURMA) REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY APPOINTED UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ILO TO EXAMINE THE
OBSERVANCE BY MYANMAR OF THE FORCED LABOUR CONVENTION, 1930 (No. 29) (1998),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm. The ILO
found "abundant evidence ... showing the pervasive use of forced labour imposed on the ci-
vilian population throughout Myanmar by the authorities and the military . I..." d  para. 528.
Additionally, before acquiring an interest in the project, Unocal hired a risk assessment group,
which stated, "[t]hroughout Burma the government habitually makes use of forced labour to
construct roads." Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g
10
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The Unocal Corporation continues to rely on economic determin-
ism as a panacea for corporate misconduct by insisting that the eco-
nomic development it allegedly brings to host nations produces eco-
nomic opportunity and thereby develops liberalization of government
policy. In a news release, Unocal discussed the Yadana project in
Burma/Myanmar, and while "not defend[ing] the actions and policies
of ... Myanmar," stated "[t]he Yadana project, which has brought sig-
nificant benefits in health care, education, and economic opportunity
to more than 45,000 people living in the pipeline area, is a step in the
right direction."58  Conversely, in 1995, Human Rights Watch "in-
formed Unocal that forced labor was 'so pervasive' in [Myanmar] that
[it could not] condone any investment that would enrich the [coun-
try's] current regime. 59 Thus, Human Rights Watch argues that the
practical effect of economic determinism not only precludes economic
opportunity, but also enriches and strengthens the regimes committing
the atrocities. Unocal still clings to outmoded paradigms of corporate
responsibility that are in binary opposition to the fundamental princi-
ples of voluntarism to which it also claims to subscribe. Unocal con-
tinues to attach primacy to political and ethical neutrality as described
in its Discussion Paper: "Unocal ... has a legal and ethical obligation
to remain politically neutral."'  Unocal employs the excuse of politi-
cal neutrality to avoid the human rights obligations it purports to sup-
port in its corporate ethics policy, but embraces active intervention in
domestic economic issues by partnering with a host nation in the fur-
therance of corporate profits. Therefore, it relies on the refrain of cor-
porate neutrality or actively engages in intervention depending upon
its perceived self-interest.
The glaring contradictions extant in the posturing of corporations
like Unocal and Exxon that try to simultaneously subscribe to the op-
posing ideologies of neutrality and voluntarism cause many to ques-
tion the benefit of voluntarism and call for the imposition of binding
granted en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), submission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.
2005). In addition, Unocal Vice-President of International Affairs Stephen Lipman, stated
under oath that SLORC would operate beyond their control and "go[ I to excess." Id. at 940-
41. Finally, the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1991 states, "'[t]he military Government [in Myanmar] routinely employs corvee labor on its
myriad building projects' and that '[t]he Burmese army has for decades conscripted civilian
males to serve as porters."' Id. at 940 n.6 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991 796-97 (1992)).
58. Unocal Corp., The Story You Haven't Heard About ... the Yadana Project in
Myanmar, http://www.unocal.com/myanmar (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
59. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1299 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
60. Unocal Corp., supra note 24.
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norms. Indeed many theorists claim that, "[i]n the absence of a
framework of legal accountability, voluntary approaches will often be
ineffective and will remain contested."6' Legal accountability can
come in the form of direct or indirect obligations and soft and hard
law. Like many other human rights instruments, Article 2(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights calls upon state
parties "to respect and . . . ensure . . . the rights recognized in the
Covenant . . .62 and therefore obligates governments to protect the
rights of those in their territories against third parties, including corpo-
rations. 63  This norm is indirectly placed on businesses as it stems
from international obligation and flows through national govern-
ments. 64 The direct obligation flows from international law and is op-
erative when governments "are unable or unwilling to [afford protec-
tion] themselves. ' 65  It is this second scenario that produces the
controversy. International norms do not specifically target nations
that have concisely defined adherence to human rights and efficient
internal regulatory structures, but rather those states without adequate
legal and regulatory safeguards or which suffer widespread corrup-
tion. Corporate voluntarism alone is not enough. In some cases, vol-
untary norms can be easy to implement "because they are adapted to
the circumstances of particular industries or firms. '66 However, where
corporations have no indirect obligations and there is a significant
profit motive to ignore human rights norms, voluntarism may be
viewed as counter-productive and costly. Ethical problems are usually
decided on the basis of profitability, 67 and "[w]hile we may expect a
corporation to behave ethically when it costs nothing, we should real-
istically expect the corporation to maximise its profits when behaving
ethically will reduce profits, even when that means exploiting sweat-
61. INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES, SUMMARY (2002),
available at www.ichrp.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Beyond Volunta-
rism: Human Rights and the Developing International Legal Obligations of Companies-
Summary of Findings").
62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights relates,
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individu-
als within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant .. " Id. (emphasis added).
63. INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See David P. Forsythe, The Political Economy of Human Rights: Transnational
Corporations (Human Rights Working Papers, Paper No. 14, 2001), http:www.du.edu/hu-
manrights/workingpapers/papers/14-forsythe-03-0t.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
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shop labour .... ,68 Moreover, corporations can be particularly sus-
ceptible when the state is committing the gravamen of the human
rights violations, allowing corporations to wash their hands of the
atrocities and rely upon the refrain of non-interference,6 9 even though
the massive violations are perpetrated in order to enhance corporate
profit.7 ° In these cases, "a legal framework provides powerful tools
and incentives for improvement" and in cases where voluntarism is
working, "anchoring these in a legal framework is likely to enhance
their effectiveness." 71
The rewards of implementing binding international norms on
transnational corporations are manifest. Not only are these corpora-
tions in the best position to influence relevant state policy and practice
in the countries where human rights are at greatest risk,72 they can en-
joy some pecuniary benefit as well, since companies that practice vol-
untarism are placed on an equal footing with those who do not.73 Un-
der a strict cost-benefit analysis, corporations must weigh the benefits
of the establishment of a clear bright line minimum standard as
against uncertainty of obligation and the potential public relations
benefits inherent in such enlightened practices. 74  Moreover, uncer-
68. Engle, supra note 40, at 105. Accord Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corpo-
rate Back: Why Corporations Have No Incentive to Define Human Rights, II MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 101, 117 (2002).
69. The Ninth Circuit's Unocal opinion responds to the issue of non-interference, at
least for American companies and concerning the most serious human rights violations, and
invalidates this approach by using an "aiding and abetting" standard. Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002). In establishing the standard, the Court relied upon a slight
modification of the Furundzija standard used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, and articulates, "we may impose aiding and abetting liability for knowing
practical assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime .. " Id. at 951.
70. Some examples include the Unocal case, in which the human rights violations were
caused by the military arm of SLORC, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, in which the Nige-
rian army inflicted the massive human rights suffering of the Ogoni peoples and Bowoto v.
Chevron, in which the Nigerian army brought about the suffering of those protesting Chev-
ron's intolerable environmental practices. See supra note 37.
71. INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 61.
72. Transnational corporations frequently have superior bargaining power over smaller
nations as they offer economic development and a ready market for natural resources upon
which the poorer nations depend. See generally Unocal Corp., supra note 24. This bargain-
ing power with partner nations allows corporations to influence their activities and could, if
asserted properly, act as a tremendous resource for remediating poor human rights practices in
all countries with which the corporations do business. This capability is alluded to in Uno-
cal's Discussion Paper, which states, "the nature of our business ... creates long-term rela-
tionships with host country leaders and other key decision makers," and "[o]ften, . . . Unocal
is able to raise concerns about human rights issues and privately present our views." Unocal
Corp., supra note 24.
73. See INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY supra note 61.
74. See id.
13
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tainty can lead to unfair competitive advantages, alien tort claims
risks, uncertainty regarding budgeting requirements for foreign pro-
jects, investor flight, and the risk of substantial loss of good faith
amongst consumers. 7  Encouraging human rights initiatives also
builds "a stable and peaceful society in which [transnational corpora-
tions] can prosper and attract the best and the brightest employees.''76
The advantage of implementing an international legal structure,
which imposes binding norms and corporate responsibility, is not
overlooked by the United Nations. The Sub-Conmmission on Human
Rights established a working group in 1998 to examine the activities
of transnational corporations (Resolution 1998/8). 77 Ultimately, this
resulted in the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corpo-
rations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
(Resolution 2003/16).78 This document asserts that corporations and
those connected with them have human rights obligations and respon-
sibilities.79 It calls for non-discriminatory treatment, security of per-
sons including, inter alia, refraining from engaging in or "benefit[ing]
from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, forced
disappearance, forced ... labour, hostage-taking ... ."0 It provides
rights for the workers including those who are nationals of developing
states and ensures them an adequate standard of living.8 It prohibits
corporations from soliciting or receiving bribes82 and references con-
75. See generally id.
76. David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 901, 902 (2003).
77. Resolution 1998/8 of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Hu-
man Rights "established, for a three-year period, a sessional working group of the Sub-
Commission, composed of five of its members, to examine the working methods and activi-
ties of transnational corporations" to "draft Norms ... on the responsibilities of transnational
corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights .... " U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Working
Group, Draft Resolution: Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, paras. 1-2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.8
(Aug. 7, 2003) (prepared by Alfonso Martinez, Guisse, Kartashkin, Park, and Weissbrodt).
78. Id. para. 3; see also Norms, supra note 4.
79. Norms, supra note 4, paras. 3-4.
80. Id. § C(3). Section D(5) states, "Transnational corporations and other business en-
terprises shall not use forced or compulsory labour as forbidden by the relevant international
instruments and national legislation as well as international human rights and humanitarian
law." Id. § D(5).
81. Id. § D. Section D(8) states, "Transnational corporations and other business enter-
prises shall provide workers with remuneration that ensures an adequate standard of living for
them and their families. Such remuneration shall take due account of their needs for adequate
living conditions with a view towards progressive improvement." Id. § D(8).
82. Id. § E(l 1). Section E( 1) states,
14
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sumer protection and the protection of the environment in accordance
with national standards and those under international agreements and
principles.83
These norms have been lauded as "a landmark step in holding
businesses accountable for their human rights abuses . ".8.."4 How-
ever, the norms must be binding and the provisions implemented in
order to achieve the benefits for both the developing nations and the
corporations. 85  Resolution 2003/16 goes beyond voluntarism 86 as it
incorporates implementation provisions, such as unilateral monitoring,
NGO involvement, state scrutiny, and provisions for adequate repara-
tions.87 These provisions arguably go farther than other multilateral
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall not offer, promise,
give, accept, condone, knowingly benefit from, or demand a bribe or other im-
proper advantage, nor shall they be solicited or expected to give a bribe or other
improper advantage to any Government, public official, candidate for elective
post, any member of the armed forces or security forces, or any other individual or
organization. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall re-
frain from any activity which supports, solicits or encourages States or any other
entities to abuse human rights. They shall further seek to ensure that the goods and
services they provide will not be used to abuse human rights.
Id.
83. Id. §§ F(13), G(14). Section G(14) states, "Transnational corporations and other
business enterprises shall carry out their activities in accordance with national laws, regula-
tions, administrative practices and policies relating to the preservation of the environment ...
in accordance with relevant international agreements, principles, objectives, responsibilities
and standards with regard to the environment as well as human rights .. " Id. § G(14).
84. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 76, at 901.
85. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has indicated that the draft norms (Resolu-
tion 2003/16) adopted by the Sub-Commission, see Norms, supra note 4, currently have "no
legal standing" but their status should be made more clear in the final report for the March
2005 meeting. UN Examines Human Rights Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations,
EuRACTIV, Nov. 5, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/business/2004/ 1 l05human
rights.htm.
86. See generally Troy Rule, Comment, Using "Norms" to Change International Law:
UN Human Rights Laws Sneaking in Through the Back Door?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 325 (2004).
Norms are obligatory and signal the end of voluntarism. Id. at 328. Norms are a valuable
tool for broadening corporate human rights obligations and expanding legal obligations,
Melinda Ching, Amnesty Int'l, Oral Statement at 55th Session of the Sub-Comm'n on the
Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights: Human Rights Responsibilities of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises (Aug. 8, 2003), http://web.amnesty.org/ li-
brary/index/ENGPOL300122003, which would impose much more extensive obligations on
corporations than existing human rights treaties, Timothy E. Deal, Senior Vice President, U.S.
Council for Int'l Business, Address at the Frank Hawkins Kenan Inst. of Private Enter. Semi-
nar: "Are Human Rights the Business of Business?" (Dec. 10, 2003),
http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?DocumentlD=2794.
87. Norms, supra note 4, § H. Section H(15) recommends that transnational corpora-
tions "adopt, disseminate and implement internal rules ... in compliance with the Norms."
Id. § H(15). It also suggests the implementation of periodic compliance reports and
"appl[ication] and incorporat[ion] [of] these Norms in their contracts or other arrangements
and dealings with contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, distributors, or natural or
other legal persons that enter into any agreement with the transnational corporation .... " Id.
15
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guidelines,8 8 such as the United Nations' Global Compact,89 the Office
of Economic Co-Operation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines
for Multinational Corporations,9' the International Labor Organiza-
tion's (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multina-
tional Corporations,91 the ILO's Labour Conventions and Recommen-
dations,92 and the United States Department of State's and United
Section H(16) recommends that transnational corporations be subject to periodic monitoring
by the U.N. and other relevant bodies and that the monitoring shall be transparent with input
from stakeholders including NGOs and that transnational corporations shall conduct their own
human rights impact studies. Id. § H(16). Paragraph 17 calls upon States to "reinforce the
necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring that the Norms and other relevant
national and international laws are implemented by transnational corporations .... " Id. §
H(17). Paragraph 18 calls for reparations for those "adversely affected by failures to comply
with these Norms" including civil and criminal sanctions. Id. § H(18).
88. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 76, at 913.
89. Id. "The Global Compact is a voluntary international corporate citizenship network
initiated to . . . advance responsible corporate citizenship and universal social and environ-
mental principles to meet the challenges of globalization." United Nations Global Compact,
Corporate Citizenship in the World Economy, human rights, labour, environment, anti-
corruption, http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2005). The Global
Compact promotes ten general principles sounding in Human Rights, Labour, Environment
and Anti-Corruption. The Ten Principles, supra note 49.
90. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 76, at 913. The OECD guidelines were adopted
in 1976 for the purpose of encouraging positive contributions to the economic, social and en-
vironmental well-being in the territories where transnational corporations conduct business.
U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. for Sustainable Dev., Initiative: OECD Guidelines
on Multinational Enterprises, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/mgroups/viapro
filesOECDGuide lines.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2005). The guidelines are voluntary and
therefore explicitly non-adversarial. Id.
91. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 76, at 913. The Tripartite Declaration of Princi-
ples was designed, inter alia, to "encourage the positive contribution which multinational en-
terprises can make to economic and social progress and to minimize and resolve the difficul-
ties to which their various operations may give rise .... " ILO, Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, para. 2 (1977), available
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/normlsources/mne.htm (last visited Sept. 1,
2005).
92. See generally ILO, ILO Declarations, International Labour Conventions and Rec-
ommendations (2001), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/comp/civil/standards/ilodcr.htm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2005). The ILO was established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 for the
promotion of the rights and welfare of workers. Id. (Referring to Treaty of Peace Between
the Allied and Associate Powers and Germany, and Protocol, pt. XI, June 28, 1919, S. Doc.
49, 1 Bevans 43 (Treaty of Versailles)). From 1919 to 2000 the ILO adopted 183 Conven-
tions and 191 Recommendations, including eight fundamental conventions: Convention Con-
cerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (Forced La-
bour Convention); Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise (No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; Convention Concerning the Appli-
cation of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, (No. 98) 1949
96 U.N.T.S. 257 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention); Convention
Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Equal Value (No. 100),
June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (Equal Remuneration Convention); Convention Concerning
the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), June 25, 1957, S. TREATY Doc. 88-11, 320
U.N.T.S. 291; Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and (No.
111), June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Con-
16
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Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office's U.S.-U.K. Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights.93 However, Resolution
2003/16 is still not memorialized in treaty or enshrined in international
customary law.94 It reflects a guideline for conduct, which goes be-
yond voluntarism but is nonetheless "soft law."95 Soft law "starts in
the form of recommendations and over a period of time may be
viewed as interpreting treaties and helping to establish custom or may
serve as the basis for the later drafting of treaties. 96 Thus, the current
enforceability of the norms is steeped in ambiguity but is on the fast
track for developing into binding international law. The current appli-
cation of the Resolution can be seen, inter alia, for Alien Tort Claims
actions, as a framework for NGO press releases concerning corporate
responsibility, and as a context for corporate public relations. 97
Some advocates of Resolution 2003/16 argue that efforts to en-
courage corporate voluntarism should be discontinued in favor of pur-
suing an agenda calling for more binding norms on corporate behav-
ior.98 In a letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Michael Posner of
vention); Convention Concerning the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No.
138), June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (Minimum Age Convention); Convention Concern-
ing the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labour (No. 182), June 17, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. 106-5, 38 I.L.M. 1207 (Worst Forms of
Child Labour Convention). ILO, supra.
93. See generally Human Rights First, Corporate Accountability, U.S.-U.K. Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/workersrights/
wrother/wrother.htm. The U.S.-U.K. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
were established in 2000 with the cooperation of "oil, mining and energy companies, [along]
with human rights, labor and corporate responsibility groups," to establish voluntary princi-
ples and to provide practical guidance for implementation of corporate security practices in
enterprises conducted abroad. Id
94. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 76, at 913-14.
95. Id. While Resolution 2003/16 is "soft law," there can be no denying that ATCA has
filled the gap of enforceability, at least in the United States, and may serve to deter corporate
misconduct with an effectiveness heretofore unseen. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)
(Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act). To this extent the ATCA serves
as hard law. See generally Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 76, at 914.
96. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 76, at 914.
97. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), dismissed on motion
for summary judgment, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003),
submission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004); supra notes 23, 37. By complying with the norms laid out in Resolution 2003/16,
corporate public relations departments possess the template with which they can advertise in-
dividual corporate responsibility and adherence to human rights norms to promote a more
humane public image and encourage greater consumer loyalty. See generally Letter from Mi-
chael Posner, Human Rights First, to Kofi A. Annan, U.N. Sec'y-Gen. (June 4, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/workersjrights/wr other/wrother.htm (follow "Hu-
man Rights First Raises Concerns About the UN Global Compact (06/11/04)" hyperlink
under "Related Material").
98. See Posner, supra note 97.
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Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers Committee for Human Rights)
expressed concerns over the fortuity of the U.N. Global Compact as
he feared the forum's integrity was compromised as a marketing tool
for some corporations who have seriously violated its basic princi-
ples,99 that "the Global Compact [should] adopt . . . a more results-
oriented" structure by adherence of its members to Resolution
200 3 / 16,1 ° and noted with disappointment that some corporate Global
Compact members have mounted "unfounded attacks against the U.N.
Norms."' 01 This critique poignantly charges that corporate volunta-
rism alone is ineffective.
In response, U.N. representatives heading up the Global Com-
pact °2 indicate that they have introduced a set of integrity measures, 103
but nonetheless acknowledge that "[t]he Global Compact is neither a
regulatory mechanism nor a seal of approval for the performance of
those participating in it."'" Clearly, initiatives, such as the Global
Compact, alone will not solve the problem of corporate complicity in
human rights transgressions, but will serve to diminish the problem.
In support of this proposition, the U.N. representatives cite a "study by
the consulting firm McKinsey & Company ... [which] found that, in
several important respects, the Global Compact has already been a
significant force for positive change."'0 5
Yet, some critics go farther and suggest that Resolution 2003/16 is
also inadequate and observe that it does not address the issue of the
wage disparity between the developing and the industrialized states.
"[T]he concept of fair compensation [is] clearly ambiguous."' 1 6 The
99. Id. at 1.
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id.
102. These representatives were John Ruggie, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General
on the Global Compact, and George Kell, Executive Head of the Global Compact, Office of
the Secretary-General. Letter from John Ruggie, Special Advisor to the Sec'y-Gen on the
Global Compact and Georg Kell, Executive Head of the Global Compact, Office of Sec'y-
Gen, to Michael Posner, Executive Dir. of Human Rights First (June 22, 2004), available at
http://www.humanightsfirst. org/workersjrights/pdf/unresponse-rmggie-kell_062204.pdf.
103. Id; see also United Nations Global Compact, Global Compact Integrity Measures
(2004), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/irj/servlet/prt/portalprtroot/com.sapportals.km.docs/
ungchtmlrcontent/AboutTheGCHowToParticipate/integrity-measures.pdf.
104. Ruggie & Kell, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has
Drafted Norms that Signal a Possible Advent of Compulsory CSR but Continue to Legitimize
a Structure that Generates Sheer Inequality Between North and South, CORP. Soc. RESP. &
HUM. RTS. (Jus Semper Global Alliance, Living Wages North and South), Sept. 2003, at 2,
available at http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Corporate%20ActivityResources/CSRand
HRnorms.pdf.
18
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international standard leaves open for interpretation what constitutes
an adequate standard of living and reinforces two standards: one for
the south (developing nations) and another for the north (industrial-
ized nations).° 7 Critics contend that, "what these Norms must address
is the dramatic exploitation of Southern workers that multinationals
practice on a daily basis as endorsed in the criteria of prevailing na-
tional conditions .... "108
The impatience expressed by these criticisms is understandable;
however, the only way to effect real change is incrementally, through
consensus building. If the Resolution required equality of wages be-
tween workers in developing states and industrialized ones, then it
would not be taken seriously and nothing could be accomplished.
This conclusion is not meant to diminish the problem of inadequate
remuneration for workers in developing states, but to acknowledge
that this goal can only be achieved pragmatically. Critics of volunta-
rism and of Resolution 2003/16 fail to recognize the necessity of
compromise. Voluntarism is an exercise in consensus building, plays
an indispensable role in exposing illegitimate rationalizations sound-
ing in corporate neutrality, and acts as a bridge from corporate auton-
omy to binding norms. By persuading corporations to voluntarily as-
sume some responsibility, the road is paved for initiatives such as
Resolution 2003/16 and ultimately more binding rules and more egali-
tarian practices.
THE VALUE OF IMPEACHMENT
One key advantage of corporate voluntarism overlooked by its
critics is its utility as an impeachment tool, both in the context of pub-
lic relations and for the purposes of legal actions. Trial attorneys have
long known of the powerful impact of prior inconsistent statements
and most contemporary lawsuits rely on the deposition or request for
admissions from adverse parties to use for subsequent impeachment.
The issuance of corporate human rights policies and acquiescence to
international initiatives, like the Global Compact, pledges the corpora-
tions to adhere to certain standards of behavior and puts them on the
record vis-a-vis their responsibility for human rights norms. If these
corporations violate human rights, then the use of the company policy
to impeach them, either in a public relations forum or in a lawsuit, can
have a devastating impact. The impeachment can be directed at spe-
107. Id. at 2-3.
108. Id. at 2.
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cific assertions by the defense or the general veracity of certain corpo-
rate leaders complicit in the atrocities alleged. The function of corpo-
rate voluntarism for impeaching the intellectual basis of corporate
neutrality has been discussed above, but it also serves to impeach spe-
cific behavior of corporations, as well as to circumvent their argu-
ments against the imposition of more binding norms.
An example of the value of voluntarism for impeaching specific
corporate conduct can be readily seen in the Unocal case"° and the is-
sue of forced labor. In its Discussion Paper, Unocal asserted that,
"[o]ur critics have accused us of using forced labor in building the
pipeline across Myanmar to the Thai border. These accusations are
absolutely false." 110 The human rights documents Unocal claims to
adopt, including the Global Sullivan Principles, prohibit "unaccept-
able worker treatment such as the exploitation of children, physical
punishment, female abuse, involuntary servitude, or other forms of
abuse."'' Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
prohibits servitude"' and principle 4 of the Global Compact calls for
"the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour.""' Not
surprisingly, forced labor also is in violation of the Unocal Code of
Conduct mandating "freedom from forced labor."'1 4  Yet, despite
these voluntary norms, the Ninth Circuit found that, "Unocal's weak
protestations notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the record con-
tains substantial evidence creating a material question of fact as to
whether forced labor was used in connection with the construction of
109. Unocal's examples of corporate voluntarism on its corporate website include its
reference to the Global Compact and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as
its claimed adherence to the Global Sullivan Principles, the U.S. -U.K. Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights, the ILO's "fundamental rights at work," the Unocal Code of
Conduct, and its own Discussion Paper. Unocal Corp., Unocal Code of Conduct: Business
Ethics: Human Rights, Labor and Community Issues (Mar. 2003),
http://www.unocal.com/ucl code-of-conduct/ethics/labor.htm. See generally Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, supra note 29; ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, 86th Session, Geneva (June 1998), available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/dclaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static-jump?var language=EN&var p
agename=DECLARATIONTEXT; U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 7; The Ten Principles, su-
pra note 49; Leon H. Sullivan, Leon H. Sullivan Foundation, The Global Sullivan Principles
(Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/ principles/gsp/default.asp.
110. Unocal Corp., supra note 24 (follow "Human Rights and Economic Engagement"
hyperlink).
111. Sullivan, supra note 109 (emphasis added); see also ILO, supra note 109; U.S.
Dep't of State, supra note 7.
112. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 29.
113. The Ten Principles, supra note 49.
114. Unocal Code of Conduct, supra note 109.
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the pipeline."'" 5 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found, "[t]he evidence
also supports the conclusion that Unocal gave practical assistance to
the Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor."" 16
While the Discussion Paper absolutely denied the use of forced
labor," 7 the president of Unocal had previously made a statement to
human rights organizations in 1995 conceding that the "Myanmar
Military might be using forced labor . . ." and stating that, "'[p]eople
are threatening physical damage to the pipeline,' that 'if you threaten
the pipeline there's gonna [sic] be more military,' and that '[i]f forced
labor goes hand and glove with the military yes there will be more
forced labor."" 18
Additionally, the Discussion Paper claims, "[n]o credible source
has ever called our attention to evidence that any forced labor was
used on the project."'" 9 Yet, years before, in 1995, "Unocal Represen-
tative Robinson confirmed to Unocal President Imle that the Myanmar
Military might be committing human rights violations in connection
with the Project."' 20 Robinson stated that he was in possession of in-
formation "from human rights organizations 'which depicted in more
detail than I have seen before the increased encroachment of [the
Myanmar military's] activities into the villages of the pipeline
area."' 11 Furthermore, that same year Amnesty International in-
formed Unocal that the Myanmar military might use forced labor
based upon representations made by a Myanmar official.122 Addition-
ally, on December 11, 1995, a private consultant, John Haseman,123
hired by Unocal reported that "the Myanmar Military was . . . using
forced labor and committing other human rights violations in connec-
tion with the [pipeline]" and stated that,
[M]y conclusion is that egregious human rights violations have occurred,
and are occurring now, in southern Burma. The most common are forced
relocation without compensation of families from land near/along the
115. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 952 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g granted en banc,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), submission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
116. 395 F.3d at 952.
117. Unocal Corp., supra note 24 (follow "Human Rights and Economic Engagement"
hyperlink).
118. 395F.3dat941.
119. Unocal Corp., supra note 24 (follow "Human Rights and Economic Engagement"
hyperlink).
120. 395F.3dat941.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. John Haseman was "a former military attach6 at the U.S. Embassy in Ran-
goon ..... Id.
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pipeline route; forced labor to work on infrastructure projects supporting
the pipeline ... ; and imprisonment and/or execution by the army of those
opposing such actions .... Unocal, by seeming to have accepted [the
Myanmar Military]'s version of events, appears at best na've and at worst
a willing partner in the situation.1
2 4
While it is noted that the impeachment material in the Discussion
Paper was actually written after the prior inconsistent statements, it
makes no difference to the impeachment value of the Discussion Pa-
per since the chronology of the inconsistent statements is irrelevant.
Indeed, Unocal's subsequent feigned adherence to various human
rights principles is also impeached by Haseman's prior statements, in-
dicated above, which were cited and relied upon by the Ninth Circuit
in the motion for summary judgment. Haseman's allegations impeach
Unocal's claim of compliance to:
1. The Global Compact (Principle 1-"[b]usinesses should sup-
port and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human
rights; and" Principle 2-"make sure that they are not complicit in
human rights abuses;" '25 and Principle 4-"the elimination of all
forms of forced and compulsory labour;" and Principle 5-"the effec-
tive abolition of child labour ... ,);126
2. The Global Sullivan Principles (Obligation to "[e]xpress our
support for universal human rights and, particularly, those of our em-
ployees, the communities within which we operate, and parties with
whom we do business... [clompensate our employees to enable them
to meet at least their basic needs and provide the opportunity to im-
prove their skill and capability in order to raise their social and eco-
nomic opportunities .. .[p]rovide a safe and healthy workplace...
[p]romote the application of these principles by those with whom we
do business.");127
3. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;128 and
4. The U.S./U.K. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights (Identification of security risks: designed "to minimize risk and
to assess whether [c]ompany actions may heighten [them;]"' 29 Human
124. Id. at 942 (emphasis added).
125. The Ten Principles, supra note 49. The Ninth Circuit found that "a reasonable
fact-finder could conclude that Unocal's alleged conduct met the actus reus requirement of
aiding and abetting [forced labor] as we define it today," Unocal, 395 F.3d at 952, and that,
"[tlhe evidence further supports the conclusion that Unocal gave 'encouragement' to the
Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor." Id. at 952 n.29.
126. The Ten Principles, supra note 49.
127. Sullivan, supra note 109.
128. See supra note 29.
129. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 7.
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rights records: requiring an assessment of the human rights records
and reputations, including past abuses and allegations of "public secu-
rity forces, paramilitaries, local and national law enforcement";130 In-
teractions between companies and public security: insuring that com-
panies have an interest and role in government action in the protection
of human rights; 3' Deployment and Conduct: "[t]he primary role of
public security should be to maintain the rule of law, including safe-
guarding human rights"13 2 and refraining from using security forces
implicated in human rights abuses.). 33
Additionally, other assertions of the Unocal Corporation are
clearly self-serving and disingenuous, such as its claim in the Discus-
sion Paper that it brought human rights experts to Burma/Myanmar
who found no human rights abuses. 3 4 However, these claims meld
into hypocrisy upon discovery that the experts were not brought in un-
til 1998, two years after the action was filed.'35 These declarations are
also soundly refuted by findings, made by Unocal's prior experts,
Robinson, Haseman, 3 6 and others'37 indicated above, which were
made during the relevant period alleged in the Complaint.'38 Thus, the
defendants were attempting to use subsequent remedial action to re-
fute prior misconduct and depended on mischaracterization to deceive
the misinformed. This ill-conceived technique provided ample im-
peachment material for opposing counsel in the course of the litiga-
tion. It also ultimately backfired as a public relations gaffe in light of
the settlement, in which a feeble defense of Unocal's human rights re-
cord in the mutually agreed upon press release'39 has resulted in
greater impeachment of Unocal's credibility.
Unfortunately, while voluntarism has been embraced by the
global corporate community, the movement to reform corporate prac-
tices through binding norms has met with spirited, but foreseeable, re-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Unocal Corp., supra note 24 (follow "Human Rights and Economic Engagement"
hyperlink).
135. Id.; see also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), dismissed on
motion for summary judgment, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), affid in part, rev'd in
part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.
2003), submission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
136. See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 939-42. See also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
138. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883-86.
139. See Unocal Corp., supra note 24.
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sistance. In addition to the attacks mounted by many Global Compact
corporations against Resolution 2003/16, indicated above,14° the or-
ganized business community has taken the initiative in combating the
ATCA. This posture contradicts the voluntary human rights norms
many of these corporations have undertaken and serves to impeach
their commitment. In the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, many of
the world's leading business organizations 41 filed an amicus brief urg-
ing the Supreme Court to nullify the ATCA. 42 The brief argues that
the statute "increasingly interferes with foreign investment and foreign
relations."' 43 In response, human rights advocates argue that the stat-
ute does not impact foreign investment or relations, as it only creates
an action for the most egregious conduct'" since,
under current law, the ATCA applies only. to slavery, torture, extrajudicial
killing, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and arbitrary de-
tention. With that objectively verifiable clarification, we are left with the
U.S. business community's naked position that in order to compete in the
global economy, they need to be free from the constraints of the ATCA,
which prevents them from using slaves and torturing workers! 1
45
Business models that depend on these practices are per se indefensible
as violating international law, accepted codes of moral conduct and
the corporation's own corporate human rights policy.
In an amicus brief in support of Respondent in the Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain case, attorney Terrence P. Collingsworth argued the in-
applicability of the profit motive to justify the nullification of ATCA.
Collingsworth asserted that, "Congress has determined that certain
egregious conduct simply cannot be the basis for profitability," despite
the alleged "competitive disadvantage" the ATCA would place on
140. See Posner, supra note 97.
141. These organizations include the National Foreign Trade Council, USA *Engage,
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the United States Council for In-
ternational Business, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Organization for Interna-
tional Investment, the Business Roundtable, the American Petroleum Institute and the U.S.-
ASEAN Business Council. Brief for the National Foreign Trade Council et al. as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004
WL 162760. These organizations "represent a substantial proportion of all entities doing
business in the United States and internationally, and .... are also major players in the global
economy...." Id. at 3.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 5 (alteration in original). The brief also raises jurisdictional, separation of
powers, and failure to provide for a cause of action issues. Id. at 13-23.
144. For a legal history of causes under ATCA, see generally Collingsworth, supra note
5, at 678-82.
145. Press Release from Terry Collingsworth, Int'l Labor Rights Fund, US Companies
Ask Supreme Court to Nullify ATCA, (Mar. 3, 2004), available at httpJ/www.labor-
rights.org/press/amicus-ilrf_0304.htm.
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U.S.-based companies.' 4  He cites as examples three corporations,
Exxon Mobil, Unocal, and Coca-Cola, and effectively impeaches their
roles as leaders in opposition to the ATCA based upon their voluntary
commitment to human rights organizations and charters.'47
After identifying Exxon Mobil as a stakeholder in the amicus cu-
riae brief in support of Petitioner, 4 8 Collingsworth uses Exxon Mo-
bil's Corporate Citizenship Report 49 and its membership in the
U.S./U.K Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights to im-
peach its position in the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain case.'50 Likewise,
Collingsworth impeaches Unocal's position by citing its own Code of
Conduct, membership in U.S./U.K Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights, as well as its reference to the U.N. Global Com-
pact, '5 and provides the same treatment to Coca-Cola via their Code
of Business Conduct. 5 2 Collingsworth concludes that none of "the
hundreds of companies that make up the Business Amici [and who]
publically [sic] extol their commitment to human rights.., can assert
even indirectly that the ATCA's very limited application to extreme
forms of human rights violations will subject them to any economic
impact.' 53
This approach captures the efficacy of using voluntary corporate
pledges for impeachment purposes and, contrary to assertions made by
Collingsworth, 54 validates the role of corporate voluntarism. These
corporations and many more 55 were impeached by their prior exhorta-
146. Id. See generally infra note 165.
147. Brief of Amici Curiae Corporate Social Responsibility Amici in Support of Re-
spondent at 24-29, Sosa. v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL
398964 [hereinafter ILRF Brief].
148. Id. at 24.
149. Id. at 25. See also EXXON MOBILE, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT 28 (2002),
http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/corporate/CCR2002_comnuitment.pdf.
150. ILRF Brief, supra note 147, at 25.
151. Id. at 26-27.
152. Id. at 28.
153. Id. at 28-29.
154. Collingsworth articulates what he considers to be the failure of voluntarism and
observes,
The collective attack on the ATCA by the U.S. business community clarifies that
any progress made in 'corporate social responsibility' is simply on paper. U.S.
companies embrace social responsibility as a public relations exercise but have yet
to make a commitment to any binding standards. That the ATCA applies only to
slavery, torture, extra-judicial killing, genocide, war crimes, crimes against human-
ity and arbitrary detention, and the business community is threatened by its appli-
cation, exposes the extreme hypocrisy-and lack of trustworthiness--of this busi-
ness community.
Collingsworth, supra note 5, at 686.
155. See supra note 141.
209
25
Kielsgard: Unocal and the Demise of Corporate eutrality
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
210 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
tions, not only in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, but also in the context of
press releases, public statements, and condemnations. 156
Collingsworth masterfully uses the fruits of voluntarism in his amicus
brief in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain to impeach Exxon-Mobil, Unocal,
and Coca-Cola. Without their voluntary claims he would not have
been able to impeach them, thus depriving him of an important
weapon in his arsenal. Additionally, Collingsworth observed that the
same corporations engaged in voluntarism brought suit through na-
tional and international commerce organizations, rather than in their
own names, in order to preserve their anonymity.157 This reluctance to
state their stance against the ATCA publicly bespeaks recognition of
their untenable and contradictory position and the negative impact it
can have on their public image and poignantly reveals the value of
having them "on the record" in the first place.' 8
Critics who call for abandoning efforts to encourage corporate
voluntarism as a vehicle for promoting human rights reveal a funda-
mental misconception of how human rights work is done. It is not a
silver bullet that instantly conforms human behavior to its mandates;
instead it is designed to encourage adherence by relentlessly building
consensus, driving home the benefits of human rights compliance, and
exposing volatile behavior with varying degrees of publicity in an ef-
fort to inexorably bring about compliance. Moreover, the first step is
to obtain a commitment from the target entity, usually a state. This
initial commitment is almost always voluntary and mirrors the founda-
tional principles of all of the major international human rights treaties.
Corporate voluntarism is modeled after this system and constitutes the
first indispensable step in the human rights model. It was never meant
156. See ILRF Brief, supra note 147, at 23-30; see also Collingsworth, supra note 145.
157. See ILRF Brief, supra note 147, at 24.
158. There is some evidence that many corporations, especially those in the oil and
natural gas extraction industry, foresaw the logical direction of voluntarism and resisted em-
bracing human rights norms. Of over 2000 companies belonging to the Global Compact no
U.S. oil or natural gas extraction company, except for Amerada Hess Corporation, is a mem-
ber. Global Compact, http://unglobalcompact.org (follow "Search Participants" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005). Unocal delayed entering into the U.S./U.K. Voluntary Principles
on Security and Human Rights until long after the suit was filed and the Voluntary Principles
were established, "maintain[ing] that its own individual corporate code of conduct, as well as
'Yadana project specific codes,' which were used during the construction of the pipeline,
[were] sufficient." Sarah M. Hall, Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocal Liabilities for
Violations of International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 401, 429 (2002). This delay
suggests that at least some companies were dragged scratching and clawing into the voluntary
schemata and resisted accepting voluntary norms because they recognized the inherent danger
to their corporate culture. In less than one year after the announcement of its ATCA settle-
ment, UNOCAL has opted to remove the Discussion Paper from its website, arguably to
avoid further impeachment.
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to be a total solution and is designed to work in conjunction with more
binding norms; they are not mutually exclusive. "Here, as in human
rights conventions, 'hard' law guarantees minimum standards, and
voluntary codes (or conventions) encourage higher standards."' 59 An-
other principle goal of human rights initiatives is to encourage states
to codify the norms agreed to in their domestic legislation. The
ATCA serves this purpose, at least in a limited way, by providing a
domestic cause of action for violation of the more basic norms of cor-
porate behavior abroad.
Unfortunately, the business community is not alone in its attacks
on the ATCA, as organs of the U.S. government have revealed their
opposition to the statute. In the Unocal case, government lawyers
filed a brief in support of the defendants' motion to dismiss."6 In
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the government, as respondent, advocated,
inter alia, for the inapplicability of the ATCA, claiming it fails to pro-
vide a cause of action. 161 In the case of Doe v. Exxon Mobil, William
H. Taft IV, 162 the Legal Adviser for the U.S. State Department, re-
sponded to a request for information by the trial judge and stated, "ad-
judication of this lawsuit at this time would in fact risk a potentially
serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United
States .... , 1163 This posture has come under attack by human rights
advocates as they characterize the government's position as
"needling] to have the flexibility to tolerate the commission of human
rights abuses by corporations in order to promote their foreign policy
[of encouraging robust investment]."'" 6 Therefore, the government's
arguments largely mirror those of the business community and are
equally invalid. Instead of attacking the ATCA, business leaders and
U.S. government officials should encourage adoption of alien tort
159. Engle, supra note 40, at 121.
160. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g granted en banc, 395 F.3d
978 (9th Cir. 2003), submission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-
56628), http://www.unocal.com/myanmar/suit-fed.htm (follow "U.S. Government" hyper-
link).
161. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
162. William H. Taft IV was also co-author of the government's brief in Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain. Brief for the United States Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/3mer/2mer/2003-
0339.mer.aa.pdf.
163. Letter from William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to Judge Louis
F. Oberdorfer, (Trial Judge for Doe v. ExxonMobil, Case No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C.) (July 29,
2002)), http://laborrights.org (follow "News and Press" hyperlink; then follow "State Depart-
ment Opinion Regarding ExxonMobil Litigation (PDF)" hyperlink).
164. Coliver, supra note 39.
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statutes in other countries in order to level the playing field 65 and,
through solidarity amongst transnational corporations, compel host na-
tions to abide by internationally accepted human rights norms.
Transnational corporations are among the most powerful and in-
fluential non-state actors on the global stage. Many corporations are
wealthier than some countries or groups of countries. By virtue of this
power, they must be bound by a minimum core standard of conduct
and have the responsibility for requiring this level of conduct from
their partners. The atrocities revealed in the Unocal case give power-
ful testimony to this proposition. Yet, this goal cannot be accom-
plished by voluntarism alone; nor is the imposition of unrealistic
treaty obligations practical under the status quo. Resolution 2003/16
is soft law, but it provides for greater accountability and the promise
of more binding norms in the future. The ATCA is a powerful tool for
human rights advocates, but is limited in scope and applicability. 166
Voluntarism needs to be encouraged as a resource for corporate lead-
ers who evince a sincere wish to abide by human rights norms, but is
insufficient alone. A legal framework of binding norms is necessary
to compliment voluntarism. This legal framework is not only neces-
sary for the observation of human rights, but also for the benefit of
corporations. As Kofi Annan stated, "[t]he unequal distribution of
benefits, and the imbalances in global rule-making, which characterize
globalization today, inevitably will produce backlash and protection-
ism."167
CONCLUSION
The recent Unocal settlement is of great significance, as much be-
cause of its timing as its implications for corporate accountability.
This development, which comes on the heels of unprecedented corpo-
rate voluntarism, helps to establish a responsibility for human rights
obligations conceded by corporate enterprises and pushes forward the
165. While there is no foreign counterpart to the ATCA, domestic jurisdiction has been
asserted by some European courts in cases alleging violations of human rights occurring in-
ternationally. Collingsworth, supra note 5, at 672. These cases include the attempts of Spain,
Belgium, and Switzerland to prosecute Pinochet, a U.K. cause of action against British asbes-
tos makers operating in South Africa, and French and Belgian causes of action against Uno-
cal's French-based corporate partner (TotalFinaElf) in Burma/Myanmar. Id. at 672 & n. 17.
166. The Supreme Court held against Alvarez-Machain finding that the conduct com-
plained of, i.e. arbitrary detention of less than 24 hours, was insufficient to create a cause of
action under the ATCA and therefore refused to expand the jurisdiction of the statute, but
nonetheless declined to reduce its jurisdiction or grant the business community's request to
nullify the ATCA. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
167. Annan, supra note 41.
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evolution of corporate accountability through more binding norms. It
also serves to deter other corporations from engaging in human rights
violations abroad. "Under the new ATCA jurisprudence developed in
Unocal, [multinational corporations] would be well-advised to con-
sider foreign host governments' practices in the context of interna-
tional law, specifically the eight acts that U.S. courts have recognized
as violations of international law that are actionable under the
ATCA."168
Unocal's adoption of a human rights policy puts it "on the re-
cord," thereby cementing its responsibility. The Unocal case aptly il-
lustrates this principle as the corporation is bound to its voluntary
commitment and impeached by its transgressions. In its decision, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed Unocal's Motion for Summary Judgment and
found sufficient evidence of Unocal's complicity in massive human
rights violations to proceed to trial. 69 While reeling from the gravity
of such atrocities, proponents for change must acknowledge that the
ultimate responsibility for the abuse rests with the corporate leader-
ship, 7 ' and that executives are vulnerable to bad publicity. Human
rights organizations must be prepared to match the corporate public
relations spin with sufficient information to inform shareholders and
others in order to aid them in changing dishonest and malevolent cor-
porate practices.17'
The utility of using a corporation's human rights policies to im-
peach its own practices makes the value of corporate voluntarism ap-
parent. In the larger context of lawsuits and public relations, the im-
peachment value of voluntarism is threefold. Corporations can be
168. Hail, supra note 158, at 421. See also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public
Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2397-98 (1991).
169. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g granted en
banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), submission withdrawn, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
170. The decision in the Ninth Circuit reflects the culpability of the Unocal leadership,
who during depositions, claimed to not even know if the Myanmar Military was providing
security for the pipeline. Id. at 938. In depositions, both President Imle and CEO Beach
claimed that they did not know if the Myanmar Military had a "contractual obligation" to
provide security for Unocal and Beach further elaborated that he didn't know of "'any support
whatsoever of the military.., either physical or monetary."' Id. These self-serving and dis-
ingenuous assertions made under oath reveal the depths to which some corporate leaders will
stoop by making obviously untrue denials of fact on the record. In its opinion, the Ninth Cir-
cuit articulated evidence contradicting these claims including, inter alia, a briefing book de-
tailing the role of the Myanmar Military and prior reports by Robinson. Id. at 938-39. Addi-
tionally, President Imle admitted to the use of conscripted porters in depositions and publicly,
but subsequently denied any human rights violations in a statement to the City of New York
pursuant to a proposed New York City select purchasing law. Id. at 942.
171. See Engle, supra note 40, for a complete discussion of the benefits and techniques
related to marketplace and shareholder (human rights) activism.
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impeached for relying upon corporate neutrality arguments, such as
cultural relativism, economic determinism, and non-intervention in
domestic affairs, as inconsistent and contradictory to the universal
human rights principles they have voluntarily adopted. Corporations
can be impeached by their conduct when it runs afoul of human rights
principles, and when they argue against binding norms, which they
claim to already be following already, by citing economic impact.
Though criticized by some, voluntarism is not merely an operation of
corporate propaganda that is self-serving and non-binding; it binds
corporations by their own admissions, serves to impeach their behav-
ior and argument, and, whether intended or not, creates an atmosphere
and infrastructure of rules that in the long run eschews the commis-
sion of atrocities. "[C]odes [of conduct] can be used to embarrass and
shame the corporation ... [i]f a corporation has expressly stated that it
will respect human rights, even in a voluntary and nonbinding code of
conduct, it will have greater difficulty defending itself credibly in
court when it does not do so."'1 72 Moreover, voluntarism prescribes
proactive corporate responsibility and establishes a new intellectual
grounding, a polemic that places primacy on human rights and wel-
comes corporate accountability.
By embracing corporate voluntarism, corporations are, sometimes
unwittingly, laying the foundation for more binding norms. Their
formidable opposition to Resolution 2003/16 and the ATCA is intel-
lectually bankrupt as inconsistent with the human rights norms they
espouse and claim to follow. Once responsibility is accepted, through
voluntary or compulsory means, jurisdiction is established. Once es-
tablished, jurisdiction empowers the human rights bodies to scrutinize
corporate behavior. Resolution 2003/16 calls for a new set of princi-
ples designed to subtly prod corporations to live up to the broad-based
claims 73 made in their corporate human rights policies or extant in the
principles of the U. N. Global Compact.74 This human rights jurisdic-
tion follows the traditional template of self-reporting, transparency,
international scrutiny and oversight, analysis of self-reported conduct
and third party reports by the relevant U.N. body, and the pursuit of a
friendly, and confidential, settlement of discrepancies. Additionally,
this jurisdiction may lead to the adoption and application of closer
scrutiny of transnational corporations' conduct by regional human
rights organizations, such as organs within the Organization of Ameri-
172. Id. at 112.
173. See Norms, supra note 4.
174. See The Ten Principles, supra note 49.
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can States (OAS). These initiatives can lead to more stringent sanc-
tions with various levels of negative publicity, and resultant bad faith,
designed primarily to halt on-going and future violations and not to
serve as retribution for past conduct.
Indeed, the corporate opposition to the ATCA and Resolution
2003/16 seriously calls into question the sincerity of the corporate
commitment to human rights. It suggests that corporations are only
committed to human rights on paper and will only live up to their
commitments if doing so will not diminish profits or result in the loss
of foreign partners or customers. This position, in conjunction with
corporate voluntarism, begs the following question: If corporations
are really abiding by their human rights commitments, then what do
they have to fear from international scrutiny and a slightly more effec-
tive enforcement scheme, which admittedly relies upon soft law
norms? If corporations are not engaging in human rights violations,
then they have nothing to fear, and their opposition is meritless. As
Collingsworth observes, "Unless these companies are misrepresenting
their compliance with their own standards, their assertion that the
ATCA is a hindrance to their economic competitiveness is simply in-
credible."' 75
However, despite current questions of sincerity, corporate ac-
countability has moved beyond the primitive jurisprudence of nihilism
or corporate neutrality. This progress can be credited, at least in part,
to voluntarism. By embracing voluntarism, corporations have made,
perhaps unknowingly, a genuine commitment to human rights and
thereby have rejected antithetical arguments sounding in corporate
neutrality, such as cultural relativism, economic determinism, and
non-intervention. They have abandoned the veil of neutrality and
have begun an inexorable process that will eventually lead to binding
corporate norms and international accountability.
175. Collingsworth, supra note 5, at 671.
215
31
Kielsgard: Unocal and the Demise of Corporate Neutrality
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
32
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2005], Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol36/iss1/15
